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In 1983, Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk made headlines
in the New York Times with their announcement that police arrests
of woman abusers were more effective in deterring subsequent vio-
lence than more informal police actions.' They based this conclu-
sion on their experiment in Minneapolis, which compared
reincidence of violence after six months among 314 abusers who
were either arrested, or temporarily separated from their victims by
the police, or given some sort of police counseling.2 The study re-
ported subsequent violence within six months by twenty-four per-
cent of those sent away temporarily, nineteen percent of those
counseled by the police, and only ten percent of those arrested.
This suggested that the making of an arrest was an effective
deterrent.
3
At the time the Minneapolis Experiment was conducted, a ma-
jority of states had adopted statutes that broadened police discre-
tion to make arrests in misdemeanor domestic abuse cases or that
mandated the use of arrest.4 These statutes were part of packages
of legislative reforms designed to provide protection and assistance
to battered women. Advocates for battered women were pressing
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, The Columbus School of
Law. B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University, 1976; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1979; LLM, Georgetown University Law Center, 1984. I appreciate the
comments on drafts of this article by Catherine Klein, Joan Meier, Philip Schrag, Law-
rence Sherman, and Joan Zorza.
1 Philip Boffey, Domestic Violence: Study Favors Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1983, at C1.
2 See LAWRENCE SHERMAN & RICHARD BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
EXPERIMENT (Police Foundation Reports 1984).
3 In discussing the legislative implications of this work, the authors emphasized that
"[t]his experiment shows the vital importance of state legislatures empowering police to
make probable cause arrests in cases of domestic simple assault." Id.
4 Lisa G. Lerman et al., State Legislation on Domestic Violence, in RESPONSE (Sept./Oct.
1983) (reporting that thirty-three states had expanded police power to make arrests in




state legislatures for adoption of additional measures to strengthen
legal remedies and police response. The Minneapolis study offered
persuasive empirical data which supported the claims of advocates
for abused women that law enforcement against abusers was neces-
sary and appropriate. 5
The Department ofJustice has spent $4 million 6 on replication
studies in an effort to test the results of the Minneapolis Experi-
ment. Four million dollars later,7 the same sociologists turned
around and told us that arrest does not have a consistent deterrent
effect on wife abusers. The New York Times recently quoted Dr.
Sherman as saying that "mandatory arrests in domestic violence
cases may cause more violence against women in the long run."
8
The Chicago Tribune reported that Sherman recommends the repeal
of all state laws requiring arrest in cases of misdemeanor domestic
violence. 9
This recommendation represents a myopic view of the problem
of domestic violence, disregards twenty years of experience of
thousands of advocates around the country, and suggests that policy
should be made or unmade on the basis of a set of narrow and ar-
guably misguided studies.' 0
Four papers based on the repliction studies funded by the De-
partment of Justice are included in this symposium issue. (These
include the articles in this volume by Richard Berk et al., Franklyn
Dunford, David Hirschel and Ira Hutchison, and Lawrence Sherman
et al.) This article offers comments about and reactions to those
articles.
While the studies reporting on this issue deal with an important
5 I have the impression that the study tended to focus policy makers on police re-
sponse as a separate entity and may have led advocates and policy makers to believe that
police action by itselfcould offer some sort of solution for abused women. I believe that a
great deal more scholarship in the last decade has focused on police response to woman
abuse than on-prosecution or court action.
6 Telephone interview with Carol Petrie, National Institute of Justice (Feb. 28,
1991). Petrie estimated that $4 million had been spent on the six replication studies.
7 I do not mean to malign the Department ofJustice for funding research on domes-
tic violence, or even for funding research on the effect of arrest. But, as my comments
indicate, I believe that the studies could have been constructed in ways that would have
allowed us to learn more from the data. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
8 Daniel Goleman, Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Violence? N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at C8.
9 Rogers Worthington, Value of Mandatory Arrest for Women Beaters Questioned, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 19, 1991, at 5C. The newspaper paraphrases Sherman's comment, and I
would be delighted to learn that they had misunderstood him.
10 1 do not wish to communicate disrespect for social science research in general, but
only to make the point that looking at one corner of a massive and multifaceted problem
through a microscope may not produce any significant new knowledge.
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topic and produce some interesting data, they reflect a test tube atti-
tude toward solving a social problem. In this case the items in the
test tube are men who batter, and the social scientists want to look
at the chemical reaction that results from adding mediation, separa-
tion of the parties, a warning, a quick little arrest, or a more time-
consuming arrest process.1'
The social scientists have done a careful job of randomly select-
ing their "mice"1 2 (men) and of isolating the effect of arrest or non-
arrest. Perhaps we may extract from these studies some objective
data that legislators may use in writing statutes. But before we send
this data to the legislators, I would suggest a few more experiments
that take account of the context in which the arrests take place, and
which factor in as variables the victims' wishes and conduct, other
pending legal action, the behavior of officers upon responding,
whether and how the cases are prosecuted, and what if any sanctions
are imposed. To think about how to design those studies, perhaps
we should take a peek outside of the test tube to identify the other
variables which might have affected the design of the replication
studies and the results obtained. In looking at the impact of arrest
as a deterrent, the social scientists have not eliminated the other
variables from the experiment, since they are not working in a labo-
ratory but on the street. However, they have ignored the impact of
some of these variables in doing their analysis.
II. THE POLICY CONTEXT
How one defines a problem often determines what one per-
ceives to be the solution. In dealing with battering, if the problem is
(as some believed in the fifties and sixties) one of female masoch-
ism,13 then the solution is treatment for the victims. If the problem
is one of chronic criminal behavior by abusers (a more contempo-
rary view), then an important part of the solution is to enforce crimi-
nal law to effectuate deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or
retribution. The researchers who conducted the replication studies
do not discuss their own views of the problem or the solution. I
11 Each study compares the effects of three of these "treatments".
12 Others have used mouse images to capture situations in which human beings were
being treated as experimental animals, see e.g., ART SPIEGELMAN, MAUS (1986), or in
which human beings have been placed in dehumanizing situations, see e.g., MON ONCLE
D'AMERIQOUE (Film by Jean Renoir, 1984). Though a mouse would not fit in a test tube,
the image is more evocative than that of a paramecium.
13 See e.g., SNELL ET AL., The Wifebeater's Wife: A Study of Family Interaction, 11 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 107 (1964).
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begin with a summary of my view, because those beliefs inform my
comments on these articles.
Men are violent and abusive toward women because this behav-
ior allows them to establish and to maintain control within the rela-
tionships. 14 Many men engage in this behavior because it is
effective in maintaining control, and because no one has ever re-
quired them to stop. Woman abuse is such a pervasive problem that
society, in addition to holding the abuser responsible, must take re-
sponsibility for rearranging law, policy, and social services to pre-
vent domestic abuse.
Both civil and criminal legal intervention are useful and impor-
tant, because they let the individual abuser, the victim, and the com-
munity know that woman abuse is a crime and will not be tolerated.
Legal intervention can help victims of abuse to become safer and to
create conditions in which separation from the abuser is possible.
Criminal action gives strong messages that violence is unacceptable,
but civil protection orders are very useful also, because of the di-
verse relief (e.g., child support, temporary custody, return of prop-
erty, eviction of the abuser, etc.) that is available as part of a civil
protection order in most states.15
Legal remedies are an essential tool in stopping domestic vio-
lence. Some policy-makers have urged that woman abuse be re-
moved from the law enforcement system and relegated to mediation
by police or by another public agency. This is a bad idea because
the use of mediation ignores the criminality of the abuser's behavior
and reinforces his control within the relationship. 16
One cannot simply initiate one intervention (arrest) in a com-
munity and expect to eradicate domestic violence. If the premise of
these studies was that making an arrest would stop the violence, the
sociologists need only have asked a few advocates whether that was
a valid premise. It is the experience of many programs which pro-
vide services to battered women that one cannot so much as make a
dent in the rate of domestic violence without a coordinated re-
sponse by the law enforcement, social service and mental health sys-
14 See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE
AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY (1979).
15 See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION CUR-
RENT COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT (1990); Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act:
Remediesfor Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61 (1984).
16 My reasons for this view are explained in LISA G. LERMAN ET AL., DOMESTIC ABUSE
AND MEDIATION: GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS AND POLICYMAKERS (1990). See also Lisa G.
Lerman, Mediation Of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 57 (1984).
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tem.17 To be effective, the entire community of professionals and
service providers who come into contact with wife abuse must be
educated about the nature of the problem, and they must collabo-
rate to address the complex problems presented by each case.
Failure of coordination will cause the failure of any individual
remedy. For example, if a statute requires the police to make arrests
but the police department does not adopt a policy implementing the
statute, the officers responding to calls may not even be aware of the
statute. 18 If a particular department adopts a policy implementing
the statute, but the officers do not receive adequate training about
the nature of woman abuse, they either may fail to make arrests or
make inappropriate arrests.19 If the police are asked to make arrests
but the prosecutor files charges in few of the arrest cases, the police
may refuse to act, because they believed that making arrests in cases
that will be dropped is a pointless exercise. If the prosecutor adopts
a policy of aggressively prosecuting abuse cases but fails to provide
victim advocacy services to maintain contact with victims, attend to
their safety needs and help them to understand the law enforcement
system, then the prosecutor often is doomed to frustration because
the victims of abuse are less likely to remain available to testify.
20 If
the prosecutor sets up a good system within the office and obtains a
high rate of convictions and guilty pleas, but the mental health com-
munity does not develop expertise on treatment of abusers and es-
tablish close communication with the courts, then most abusers will
receive little effective attention. If the probation department fails to
monitor abusers who have been convicted of or who plead guilty to
charges of spouse abuse, then there will be no deterrent to engaging
in post-conviction recidivism.
Requiring that police arrest suspects in domestic violence cases
is a useful component of a coordinated response. 2 1 Absent a re-
17 See e.g., Jeffrey L. Edelson, Coordinated Community Responses, in WOMAN BATrERING:
POLICY RESPONSES 203 (Michael Steinman ed. 1991).
18 David Hirschel and Ira Hutchison point out that since the Minneapolis Experi-
ment, there has been a fourfold increase in police departments with pro-arrest policies,
but that most departments still have not changed their policies to conform with statutes.
David Hirschel & Ira Hutchison, Female Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte,
North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1992).
19 In the District of Columbia, a departmental policy requiring police to file reports
and make arrests seemed to have virtually no impact on police conduct. See Saundra
Torry, DC Targets Domestic Violence: Law Requires Arrest if Abuse Suspected, WASH. POST, Nov.
11, 1991, at CI.
20 See U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. Department
ofJustice, Final Report 10-26 (1984); LISA G. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE:
INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (1981).
21 Some of the reasons for preferring that arrest be mandated by statute are ex-
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quirement that arrests be made, police make very few arrests in do-
mestic abuse cases. 22 If the police have the discretion to decide
whether or not to make an arrest in a woman abuse case, they usu-
ally exercise that discretion not to make the arrest. Mandatory
arrest is therefore one feature of an appropriate criminal justice re-
sponse, but it is not a sufficient response. 23
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE DATA
My comments on these data are informed by incomplete under-
standing of the technical language in the replication papers. 24 Nev-
ertheless, I venture a few observations based on the researchers'
own conclusions about their data and a few questions about how the
researchers constructed the experiments. 25
A. IS ARREST AN INDEPENDENT DETERRENT?
The replication studies have produced rather inconsistent an-
swers to the question of whether arrest is an effective deterrent of
domestic violence. In some cases, different conclusions have been
reached about one another's data. In two out of four sites, Milwau-
kee and Colorado Springs, the researchers found a deterrent effect
from making arrests compared with other police responses in cases
plained in Sarah Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 213
(1988).
22 Sherman & Berk, supra note 2, at 2 (reporting studies that indicated arrest rates in
domestic violence cases of ten percent and three percent). A 1989 study in DC found an
arrest rate of five percent in domestic violence cases. D.C. Coalitition Against Domestic
Violence, (Press release) "Study of D.C. Police Response to Domestic Violence Shows
Police Do Not Make Arrests, in Violation of their own Guidelines," November 3, 1989.
23 Changing criminal justice response to a problem is complex. It is not always pos-
sible to secure change in every institution at the same time. I recently participated in
drafting a mandatory arrest bill for the District of Columbia, as part of the Legal Com-
mittee of the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence. In our decision to make police
response a primary focus, we considered the chicken/egg question: we were very con-
cerned both about inadequate police response and about the apparent unwillingness of
the United States Attorney's Office (which acts as the local prosecutor in D.C.) to prose-
cute any but a trivial number of domestic violence cases. Some of us felt that by
strengthening police response, we would put pressure on the prosecutor's office to take
these cases seriously because when an arrest is made, a decision regarding whether or
not to file charges must be made.
24 It does seem that empirical research presented in an interdisciplinary journal to an
audience of policy makers ought to be translated into English. These papers are com-
prehensible in significant part, but they do not reflect much awareness of their non-
social science audience.
25 The National Institute of Justice may do some comparative analysis of the data
produced by the six replication studies. Telephone interview with Carol Petrie, National
Institute of Justice (Feb. 28, 1991). Reports from two of the sites (Atlanta, GA, and
Dade County, FL), are not yet available. Id.
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in which the suspect was "employed, married, high school graduate,
and white" (Milwaukee) and in which the suspect was employed by
the U.S. military (Colorado Springs). In Milwaukee, arrest was ob-
served to have a criminogenic effect (i.e., the arrest appeared to in-
crease the likelihood of subsequent assault) on a socially "marginal"
subcategory of cases. In two other sites, Omaha and Charlotte, the
data does not indicate any difference in the likelihood of recidivism
between the cases in which the suspects were and were not arrested.
In Milwaukee and Charlotte, researchers identified different
factors that predicted whether subsequent violence was likely. In
Milwaukee,
[e]mployed, married, high school graduate and white suspects are all
less likely to have any incident of repeat violence reported to the do-
mestic violence hotline if they are arrested than if they are not. Unem-
ployed, unmarried, high school dropouts and black suspects, on
average, are reported much more frequently to the domestic violence
hotline if they are arrested than if they are not.26
In Charlotte, in contrast
the strongest predictors of recidivism were measures of prior criminal
activity, such as possession of a local (felony or misdemeanor) record,
possession of a state (felony) record, and number of prior non-traffic
arrests within the preceding five years. Further, while prior criminal
activity was associated with recidivism, other offender-related vari-
ables, such as race, age, marital and employment status, were not.
Moreover, knowledge of an offender's prior criminal activity produced
only a modest contribution to predicting correctly an offender's
probability of recidivating. 27
However, the Charlotte study found that the likelihood of recid-
ivism was not significantly affected by whether or not the police
made an arrest-the only reliable predictors were the offender
characteristics presented above. Researchers David Hirschel and
Ira Hutchinson explain that "[t]he results of the Charlotte experi-
ment are decisive and unambiguous, and indicate that arrest of mis-
demeanor spouse abusers is neither substantively nor statistically a
more effective deterrent to repeat abuse than either of the two other
police responses examined in this location." They conclude that
"[t]he results of the Charlotte and Omaha studies suggest that there
is not adequate support for a mandatory or presumptive arrest pol-
icy based on specific deterrence. The hope that arrest alone could
contribute to the solution of this serious problem is 'unfulfilled." 28
26 Lawrence Sherman, et al., The Variable Effects of Arest on Criminal Careers: The Mil-
waukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (1992).
27 Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 18, at 104.
28 Id. at 115, 117.
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Two of the replication studies, then, found that arrest deterred
some people and two of the studies found that arrest did not appear
to have a deterrent effect. No site, however, produced data indicat-
ing a deterrent effect as strong as that shown by the Minneapolis
data. In Minneapolis, the strong deterrent effect was observed in a
population that (based on the Milwaukee and Charlotte studies)
would indicate a high likelihood of subsequent violence; in the Min-
neapolis sample, sixty percent of the suspects were unemployed,
fifty-nine percent had prior arrests, and eighty percent had commit-
ted prior domestic assaults.
29
B. ARREST OUT OF CONTEXT
What conclusions are we to draw from this new wisdom?30 If
arrest does not clearly help to stop violence or reduce calls to the
police (depending on which objective one had in mind), should it be
abandoned?
These studies provide a limited measure of the specific deter-
rent effect of arrest when all other forms of intervention are ignored
or avoided. If we measured any other aspect of the criminal justice
system against this yardstick, it undoubtedly would be found want-
ing. If the system does not accomplish all of the intended effects, or
if it might not, should we abandon it?
As to the "good risks," arrest may be beneficial regardless of
the action or inaction of other parts of the law enforcement system.
As to "bad risks," it appears that arrest alone might be an aggravat-
ing circumstance. Even among the likely recidivists, the data from
Milwaukee suggest that arrest does appear to have a short-term (one
month) deterrent effect. 31 But to achieve a longer-term deterrent
effect, it actually may be necessary to enforce the law in other more
lasting ways.
Will arrest produce a demonstrable deterrent effect when com-
bined with prosecution, incarceration, treatment for the abuser,
shelter and other services for the victim and her children, and other
court orders addressing contact, custody, support and other issues?
This question remains to be examined in another set of
experiments.
Even if a law enforcement approach fails to result in specific
29 Sherman & Berk, supra note 2, at 5.
30 See infra at 238-40.
31 In analyzing the Milwaukee data, Berk et al. point out that "the two arrest treat-
ments seemed to delay the onset of new violence by a little more than a month com-
pared to the warning treatment." Richard Berk et al., A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado
Springs Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 173 (1992).
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deterrence in some cases, enforcement of the law (including arrest,
prosecution, and the use of other legal remedies for abuse) sends an
appropriate message to the community-that domestic violence is
not acceptable. Specific deterrence of a particular offender is not
the only goal. When an arrest is made, the victim may become more
confident of her right not to be abused; her children might begin to
understand that violence is not "normal" and is not their mother's
fault; other men and women in the community may judge their own
situations and conduct differently if they see or hear about arrest or
prosecution of a neighbor or co-worker.3
2
C. POLICE DATA VS. VICTIM DATA ON SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS
One striking difference between the Minneapolis data and the
data produced in the replication studies is that, in tabulating subse-
quent incidents of violence, the Minneapolis study collected infor-
mation from victim interviews and police reports and arrived at
cumulative totals. The more recent studies kept these two sources
of information separate but accorded greater weight to the data ac-
quired from the police. For example, in comparing the outcomes
obtained at the various sites, Richard Berk and his colleagues used
"official data" as the measure of "outcome," explaining that "the
'cleanest' story is told from the treatment assigned and the official
data;" the data produced by the victim interviews is characterized as
"weaker."33
Berk and his colleagues also indicated that the authors of the
Milwaukee study, while they collected both official and victim data,
"have (to date) focused on the official data, which they felt was far
more reliable than the data extracted from the interviews with vic-
tims." 3 4 Indeed, the researchers were not able to talk to all of the
victims, nor did the victims consistently call the police when another
incident occurred.
In the Colorado Springs study, the researchers noted that
"when the Colorado Springs outcome is constructed from the victim
reports rather than from the official data, a strong treatment effect
surfaces; the odds multiplier for arrest is approximately .65, and the
Bayesian ninety-percent confidence region no longer includes
1.0. ' ' 35 I think this means that the odds of a subsequent incident of
violence being reported after arrest are sixty-five percent of what
32 See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 18, at 118.
33 See Berk, supra note 31, at 194.
34 Id. at 173.
35 Id. at 197.
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they are if no arrest is made. This appears to parallel the Minneapo-
lis data. The authors suspected that the victims linked to bad risk
suspects were more difficult to re-contact, which would lead to over-
emphasis of data collected from good risk suspects. Another possi-
bility, however, is that police data is an unreliable source of
information about reincidence of violence and that the results pro-
duced using such data are ambiguous and misleading. A third pos-
sibility is that the victims of bad risk suspects are more likely to
request police assistance than are victims of good risk suspects, be-
cause of the social stigma attached to calling the police. If this is the
case, the apparent deterrent effect among good risk suspects may
represent under-reporting.
The Charlotte study does confirm that police data produces a
drastically low estimate of the actual percentage of cases in which
more violence occurs. The authors noted that, "[b]ased on police
data, repeat incidents are the exception rather than the rule." Inter-
views with victims, however, indicate "alarmingly high levels of re-
peat incidents of spouse abuse, confirming that the scope of the
problem is far greater than police data indicate .... 61.5% of wo-
men have experienced another abusive incident within six
months." 3
6
Use of police data is preferred over victim data because the
whole sample of victims is assumed to have at least the opportunity
to call the police. Victim data is incomplete because some victims
cannot be recontacted, while others cannot remember or do not
wish to talk about what happened. But the variables that determine
whether anyone calls the police when violence occurs are at least as
unpredicable and as complex as the location and memory of the vic-
tims. The data looks neater if police reports are used, but do they
reflect even a representative sample of the incidence of recidivism?
D. VARIATIONS IN POLICE BEHAVIOR: ABUSER DETERRENCE AND
VICTIM DETERRENCE
What do we know about how the police behaved during the ex-
periments? In Milwaukee, the police worked from a script, at least
with the suspects whom they did not arrest. We are not told what
they said, but we can presume that there was some degree of consis-
tency in police communnications with the parties. In Omaha, on the
other hand, there was little effort to make the police behavior within
each treatment uniform. Suppose that, at one site at which no script
was given to the officers, the following two scenarios took place:
36 See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 18 at 116.
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In one arrest case, the officer came in, looked around and, in
the presence of the victim, said the following to the abuser:
"Why did you hit her?"
"She's been catting around again."
"Listen, buddy, I know how you feel. Believe me, I understand. But
we are doing this study at the department, and I am going to have to
take you in. If it were up to me, I would not do it. Maybe I would even
take her in. But under our new policy, I'm supposed to bring you in."
In another case, suppose that an officer came in and, after sur-
veying the room, took the victim to a private place to talk, out of the
earshot of the abuser, and said:
"Ma'am, I can see you got something you did not deserve. Can
you tell us about it?"
During her story, he took notes, nodded, and listened. Then he
told her that the abuser would be arrested but might be released in a
matter of hours. He then asked whether she would like transporta-
tion to a safer location. After helping the victim to work out her
plans, the officer returned to the other room and said:
Sir, you are under arrest for misdemeanor assault. Just because she is
your wife doesn't mean you can do this. If you are convicted of these
charges, you could spend six months in jail or be fined $10,000 or
both. And believe me, quite a few guys are doing time for just what
you did to your wife tonight. You will come with us.3
7
In the replication studies, these two interactions would be cate-
gorized as the same "treatment." It would not be uncommon for
officers in the same department to behave so differently. The diver-
gence of behavior might be limited by the existence of state or mu-
nicipal laws or departmental policies that encouraged police to treat
violence as a crime. It might be limited by the active implementa-
tion of those laws or by policies of the police department, the prose-
cutors' office, or the courts.
We are not offered much information about the context in
which each of these experiments was conducted. To the extent that
police behavior could vary this much, inconclusive results would not
be surprising.
Police behavior during response undoubtedly affects both the
likelihood of subsequent violence (deterring the abuser) and the
likelihood that the victim will call the police for help during the next
incident (deterring the victim),38 If police behavior in a significant
37 These dialogues are fictitious, but they are extrapolated from many conversations
between the author and abused women, police officers, and advocates for abused wo-
men about the range of conversations that take place between police officers and abused
women.
38 In 1984 Sherman and Berk observed that
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number of cases deterred victims from calling the police again, then
the variance in behavior might obscure any differences between the
assigned interventions.
Victims of abuse may also have been deterred from calling the
police in cases assigned to a non-arrest intervention because of dis-
appointment with the police response. If the police warned the
abuser and did not make an arrest, the victim may be less likely to
call the police for subsequent incidents because she may perceive
that they did not help her. (Imagine, for example, that the police
"counseled" the couple, and the beating continued following the
departure of the police.) If the police made an arrest, the victim
may be more likely to call them after the next incident because she
may perceive that they were taking action to protect her. This
could skew the data on recidivism higher in the arrest group and
lower in the warning group, compared with the actual recurrence of
violence. 39 The likely skewing raises additional questions about the
researchers' reliance on the police data rather than the victim
interviews.
Do the descriptions of the experiments reveal anything about
the type of skewing that might have occurred? Is it in fact likely that
the non-arrest group was discouraged from reporting? Joan Zorza
points out that in Charlotte and Omaha the victims were en-
couraged to leave the home in many cases. 40 This intervention
could be read by the victim as signifying that the police believe that
she is at least partly responsible for the problem. If the abuser
tends to blame the victim for the violence and the victim blames
herself, then many victims would be prone to interpret police evic-
tion from the home as signifying that the victim had done wrong.
In many cases the victim is not safe if she stays home, and the
only safe solution is for her to go elsewhere. The police can en-
courage the victim to relocate without communicating blame, but if
this "removal of one of the parties" was part of a standard operating
procedure, one might wonder what was said, which victims were re-
moved, how they interpreted their eviction, and what impact that
There was one factor... that seemed to govern the effectiveness of arrest: whether
the police showed interest in the victim's side of the story. ...
If the police do listen, that reduces the occurrence of repeat violence even more.
But if the victims think the police did not take the time to listen, then the level of
victim-reported violence is much higher. One interpretation of this finding is that
by listening to the victim, the police "empower" her with their strength, letting the
suspect know that she can influence their behavior.
Sherman & Berk, supra note 2, at 6.
39 This analysis assumes that the victims prefer law enforcement to warning.
40 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 68 (1992).
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conduct could have had on subsequent reporting of violence to the
police by those victims.
E. DOES POLICE INTERVENTION "CAUSE" SEPARATION, OR VICE
VERSA?
In the Milwaukee report, any police response to a domestic vio-
lence call is said to have the effect of tending "to split the couple
up." Many couples ceased to cohabit between the time of the arrest
and the time of the follow-up interview.4 ' The researchers assumed
that separation reduces the risk to the victims, presumably by reduc-
ing contact hours. They give no basis for concluding that there is a
causal connection between the police response and the separation,
beyond the reduced number of cohabitatants. In light of the fre-
quent escalation of abuse that accompanies the victim's attempt to
separate, this assumption is a dubious one.42
Perhaps, instead, it is separation that "causes" arrest. Victims of
abuse may call the police because they are attempting to escape the
violence and the many other types of control exercised over them by
their abusers. Perhaps the police are likely to be called at a point at
which there is some psychic separation that has not yet resulted in
the woman obtaining a separate place to live. Calling the police cer-
tainly communicates a message that the behavior is unacceptable.
These data may indicate that women who call the police are likely to
separate from their abusers. To assume that the separation is
"caused" by the arrest is to treat the women as inanimate objects
who are acted upon by the abusers and the police but whose own
actions are disregarded.
This other imponderable human factor (the victims, largely in-
visible in these studies) may account for some of the other observed
effects of arrest. Consider the "marginal" group in Milwaukee in
which arrest seems to increase the likelihood of more violence. If
the victim calls the police, arrest of the abuser communicates to the
woman that she has a right not to be abused. The arrest may vali-
date her struggle to escape from the abuser. This may lead her to
insist on greater personal autonomy-to be able to leave the house
without permission, not to be followed around, to be able to go to
41 Sherman et al., explain:
ninety percent of the 1200 police reports and seventy-four percent of the 900 initial
victim interviews reported that the couples were cohabiting on the date of the
presenting incident. This compares to only forty-one percent of the total follow-up
interviews reporting cohabitation since the presenting incident.
Sherman et al., supra note 26, at 152.
42 See Martha Mahoney, Legal Inages of Battered H'omen: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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school or get a job, see friends, or whatever. At the same time the
abuser may be angered by the appearance, evidenced by the arrest,
that the "system" was on her side. These types of dynamics could
explain increased violence.
This hypothesis could explain the results reported by Sherman,
et al., but it would lead to different conclusions. Rather than recom-
mending that the police cease to make arrests because the arrest is
viewed as a "cause" of subsequent violence, this analysis would indi-
cate that the law enforcement system must continue to offer protec-
tion and support to the victim and to incarcerate or monitor the
abuser after an arrest is made.
F. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARREST AND UNEMPLOYMENT TO
SUBSEQUENT VIOLENCE
The Milwaukee data indicate that abusers who are unemployed
are more likely to become violent in the six months following arrest
than they would be if they had not been arrested. The authors do
not speculate as to the reasons for this correlation, except for some
references to the stake in society (need to go to work) of employed
men and their consequent significant response to arrest.
There are other possible explanations of this data. One, men-
tioned above, is that the victims of employed abusers may be more
reluctant to call the police after an arrest is made due to social
stigma or other reasons. There may be no deterrent to violence;
there may be only a deterrent to calling the police.43 Another possi-
bility is that, if the victim is employed and the abuser is not, the
abuser may resent the victim's greater level of productivity and so-
cial status, and resent being economically dependent on the victim.
Such resentment, exacerbated by arrest, could increase the likeli-
hood of assault.
G. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER ARREST?
4 4
Most of the researchers seem to prefer to create the impression
that they are studying the effect of arrest in a vacuum. They note
the fact that the courts do not prosecute many abuse cases, but they
then treat this as an immutable status quo and ignore the fact that
the effect of arrest may depend entirely on the type of follow-up.
They refer to arrest as both "treatment" and "punishment," as if
43 Some victims might be deterred from calling the police because of threats of harm
or death that would follow any additional contact with the police.
44 See BRIAN FORST ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ARREST? (1977).
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our criminal justice bureaucracy is a toggle switch capable of only
two things: arrest or non-arrest.
These studies provide very little information about whether
there was any attempt to enforce the law after arrest in the cases
included in the study. They also fail to examine whether the other
intervention had any impact on the deterrent effect of arrest. The
Charlotte study mentions that thirty-five percent of the cases in the
sample in which the police made an arrest were prosecuted, but it
does not discuss the outcomes in those cases (except to mention
that less than one percent of the convicted offenders received jail
sentences). The study also fails to mention the reasons why sixty-
five percent of the cases did not result in prosecution, or whether
the abusers in cases that did result in prosecution were more effec-
tively deterred than were abusers in the cases that were not
prosecuted.
45
To study effectively the deterrent effect of arrest and prosecu-
tion, or to compare the impact of arrest alone against the impact of
arrest and prosecution, it would be necessary to randomly assign a
group of cases to prosecution. At least in Milwaukee, the research-
ers tried to secure the cooperation of the prosecutor's office and
failed. Perhaps this question will be asked during the site selection
process when the next study of this sort is planned. There are some
prosecutors who are interested in stopping domestic violence.
Another datum we are given regarding additional procedures is
that the Colorado Springs study looked at a large number of cases in
which arrest was followed by the victim's obtaining an Emergency
Protection Order, which was not part of the experiment at the other
sites. 46 We are not told what relief the court ordered or in what
proportion of cases the court issued a longer-term order. The rate
of subsequent violence in Colorado Springs appears to be lower
than that in Milwaukee and Omaha. 47 Is this because victims ob-
tained protection orders or because victims received some other
services that were not part of the experiment? These studies ask
their readers to assume that the outcomes in these cases are linked
to arrest alone, even without knowing what other interventions or
relief victims may have obtained.
Perhaps taking a "non-marginal" working person and letting
him spend a night at the police station may be enough all by itself to
scare him into behaving better. Perhaps arrest alone does not have
45 See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 18 at 117.
46 In Milwaukee, cases in which a victim had obtained a restraining order were ex-
cluded from the sample.
47 Berk, et al., supra note 31, at Table 3.
1992]
LISA G. LERMAN
that impact on people who have been in such a situation a few times
before. If one accords credence to the new results indicating that
arrest may not be a significant deterrent for some domestic abusers,
then the implication of this study is that higher priority must be
given to prosecuting these cases, obtaining protection orders for the
victims, 48 and ensuring that the abusers are incarcerated or placed
in treatment programs for alcohol abuse or for battering, or all of
the above.
4 9
H. THE ATTITUDES OF THE RESEARCHERS
The articles presenting the results of the replication studies that
are published in this issue disclose little about the authors' views on
domestic violence or about their experience in this field. One won-
ders whether the researchers believe that they are presenting objec-
tive reality rather than a point of view.50
Who are the people who conducted this research? What do we
know about their perspectives about and experience working on do-
48 After a suspect is arrested, a judge can (as a condition of release or as an in-
dependent civil order) issue a very specific injunction designed for the protection of the
victim. The effect of arrest might be quite different if such an order is issued, in writing,
and a copy given to the police.
49 Prosecutors can require abusive men to get treatment for their violence problems
while charges are pending and can ask ajudge to require continued treatment as part of
the disposition of the case. Abusive men generally will not go to treatment of their own
free will, but they can be compelled to go if they have criminal charges pending against
them (as a condition of release on bail), or have a chance at a suspended jail sentence.
This type of coercion is not found to interfere in the treatment of abusers as it might
with other problems, and it provides ongoing monitoring and attention to the behavior
of the abuser. See Donald G. Dutton & Barbara M.S. McGregor, The Symbiosis ofArrest and
Treatment for Wife Assault: The Case for Combined Intervention, in WOMAN BArrERING: POLICY
RESPONSES 131 (Michael Steinman ed., 1991). These authors conclude, after examining
the effectiveness of specialized treatment for abusers in Canada, that
"law and order" and treatment approaches operate symbiotically to reduce further
violence. Arrest serves both a didactic and deterrent function, showing the man
that wife assault is unacceptable and will be punished by the state. Treatment then
provides the opportunity for the man to learn new responses to the interchanges
with his wife that formerly generated violent behavior.
Id. at 150.
50 1 provide here some information about my own background, to enable the reader
to better understand the perspective from which I write. I began working on woman
abuse in 1979 when I became the Staff Attorney on a Family Violence Project at the
Center for Women Policy Studies. I had had little exposure to issues of domestic vio-
lence before I started work on this project. I brought to this project a feminist perspec-
tive, and some previous work on violent pornography to my role as Staff Attorney.
Working under a federal grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, I
studied the usefulness of the various legal interventions in domestic violence situations,
reading the literature, participating in professional meetings, and doing site visits,
mostly to federally funded demonstration projects. My perspective reflects extensive
contact with lawyers and other advocates for abused women.
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mestic violence? From the articles, one can discern that they are
twelve men and three women, mostly academics, a few police of-
ficers. The non-inclusion of this type of information is standard
practice in most professional writing. However, more information
would be useful in trying to understand their work. What do they
believe about domestic violence? Why did they do this work? One
can discern partial answers to some of these questions from the arti-
des, but they are written in traditional anonymous academic style.
This "invisible author" approach is especially ill-suited to this field
because the personal beliefs of the professional make an enormous
difference in how the person perceives the problem of domestic vio-
lence and the appropriate responses. Did the researchers receive
any advice or assistance from those who work with battered women
or with men who batter? If not, why not?
The articles offer little information about the methodology
used by these researchers. We do not know who conducted the fol-
low up interviews, whether they were done by men or women,
whether they were done in person or on the telephone, whether the
abuser was present during the conversation, or what questions the
interviewers asked. How can we interpret these results without this
type of information? 51
I ask these questions in part because these studies approach the
problem of wife abuse from some considerable distance; the studies
are not designed with a good understanding of the perspective of
the victim. 52 I offer a few examples that raise concerns about the
authors' perspectives.
1. "Non-Serious" Domestic Violence
In the Omaha study, the author mentions that "serious (i.e., fel-
ony) cases were excluded" from consideration. Because this was a
randomized experiment, in which some women received less protec-
tion than they would have if police had been using their own discre-
tion, it was essential to try to screen out cases in which the risk of
harm from the experiment was greatest. Nevertheless, anyone who
has worked with battered women who has tried to get assistance
from the police or the courts would not have characterized the cases
included in the experiment as "non-serious." Most advocates for
51 Dr. Sherman reported to me that in Milwaukee, all of the victim interviewers were
women, about half were black, and said that they were recruited from battered women's
shelters and from universities. Telephone conversation between Lawrence Sherman
and the author, May 7, 1992.
52 In some of my comments I undoubtedly overgeneralize in my reactions to these
articles-this is almost inevitable in a'short commentary of this sort.
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battered women regard any violence between intimates as serious.
In every case of domestic violence, there is a likelihood that the vic-
tim will suffer more violence at the hands of that offender. In most
cases, he has continued access to the victim. The attempt to distin-
guish serious from non-serious domestic violence is useful only to
those who wish to exclude some of the cases from the law enforce-
ment system.5
3
One could define some violence as non-serious by looking at
the degree of injury inflicted. This analysis is inappropriate because
much unmistakably violent behavior causes no injury at all. For ex-
ample, if a man throws a lamp at the head of a woman but misses
and the lamp explodes against the wall, the woman may not be in-
jured at all, but her life may be in serious danger.
If one measures the seriousness of the violence by intent, one
finds that the defining characteristic of domestic violence is that it is
intended to cause physical harm to a woman or to make her fear that
she will suffer harm in the future. It need not involve any touching.
The expression of that intent by a man toward a woman with whom
he is or has been in an intimate relationship is serious. Is it non-
serious if he only wants to scare her, or if he intends to hurt her but
not very badly? The answer is apparent in the question.
If those who conducted these experiments shared the perspec-
tive that all domestic violence is serious, they might have been reluc-
tant to undertake this research. Suppose one of the calls to the
police that was assigned to mediation was followed a week later by a
murder? If this had been perceived as a genuine possibility, the ex-
periments might have been conducted differently, or, indeed, not
done at all. 54 Was this category of crime selected for this experi-
ment in deterrence because of a perception that it is less serious
than other violent crime?
The authors of the Charlotte study assert that it is obvious that
"premium jail space will not be used on misdemeanant spouse abus-
53 See, e.g., Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of
Domestic Violence, 7 VT. L. REV. 15-25 (1982) (explaining the exclusion of domestic vio-
lence cases involving serious injury from mediation, and then offering as an example of a
non-serious injury case one in which the abuser carried a gun and the victim's injuries
required a visit to the emergency room but involved no broken bones.) Id. at 22, 24.
54 When the Minneapolis experiment was funded, many advocates for abused women
(I among them) were concerned about the risks posed to victims from random assign-
ment, and the about ethical dilemma and potential liability for the researchers presented
by doing this type of experimental work. We were especially concerned about experi-
menting on a set of cases that involve violent crime and that present a high likelihood
that the same suspect will attack the same victim again.
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ers.'55 The tone of this comment is similar to the comment in the
Omaha study about the exclusion of "serious" cases of domestic
abuse. Do the authors believe that what we are dealing with here is
a little non-serious criminal activity, perhaps down there with litter-
ing or shoplifting? In fact, it is common practice by law enforce-
ment officials to classify as a misdemeanor, domestic violence
offenses that would be treated as felonies if the act in question had
been committed against a stranger. Thus, the misdemeanor/felony
distinction is not a meaningful one in the domestic violence context.
2. Failure to Hold the Abuser Responsible for the Violence
In the Omaha study, one of the "treatment" 56 options was to
send "one of the parties" away from the scene.57 The author says
nothing about who was or should have been removed-as if the only
significant part of the intervention is to get the parties temporarily
physically separated and that who goes where is irrelevant. This
neutral reference to separation suggests that the researcher may not
recognize the fairness question (why should the victim leave because
of the spouse's criminal conduct?) and the safety question (if the
victim stays, will she be a sitting duck for the next assault) implicit in
any "separation" intervention. Assuming that the author has de-
scribed the intervention adequately, this "separation" option, built
into the experiment, is one which appears to make no systematic
effort to communicate to the abuser that his violence is his responsi-
bility. Perhaps some officers would communicate that idea, and
others would not. Does the author understand that the essential
purpose of enforcing the law in domestic violence cases, as in other
criminal cases, is to force the offender to take responsibility for con-
trolling his conduct?
3. The Exclusion of Non-Cohabitants
The researchers in the Charlotte and Milwaukee studies in-
cluded only spouse or "spouse-like" relationships, perhaps reflect-
ing a belief that these are the main categories of battering
relationships that are worthy of study. This erroneous assumption
55 See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 18, at 118.
56 Perhaps it is standard to refer to the thing you are testing in a social science exper-
iment as a "treatment," but it seems misleading in this context, in that the word conveys
the impression that the arrest itself is a discrete and independent response, complete
and separate from any other aspect of law enforcement. The use of this word reflects
the failure of the researchers to view arrest as a step in the law enforcement process.
57 See Franklyn W. Dunford, The Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 120 (1992).
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may be an unfortunate consequence of the absence of terminology
that accurately describes the problem of the battering of women
who are or have been in intimate relationships with their abusers.
Despite inadequate terminology, most people who work in domestic
violence learn early in their work that this is not a problem defined
by marital status or living arrangement but by intimacy and aggres-
sion. These studies include no mention or explanation of the rea-
sons for excluding the significant number of battering cases that
involve people who are or have been dating but not cohabiting.
Perhaps the researchers recognized that there is a significant
group of battering relationships that involve parties who are or have
been dating but not living together. 58 If they had not known that
before, then in Charlotte this should have become apparent from
the fact that police received 47,687 calls that were coded as domes-
tic violence, and only 18,963 were determined at the scene to in-
volve "spouse-like" situations.
It is possible that the definition of the problem to exclude non-
cohabitants reflects a definition in a statute or police policy. If this
is the case, it should be explained. Otherwise the research perpetu-
ates this too-narrow definition of domestic violence. This is impor-
tant because others may draft statutes and policies based on this
research, which provide remedies or services to victims who are
married to or living with their abusers, and which exclude others.
Another thing that is lost by the exclusion of non-cohabitants is the
possibility of understanding the relationship between deterrence
and the degree of commitment of the parties. The non-cohabiting
parties may be younger, their relationships of shorter duration; and
it is possible that they would react to police intervention in quite a
different way.
4. The Probable Cause Determination
The researchers in the Charlotte study excluded from the ex-
periment eighty-two percent of the 18,693 spouse-like cases because
"there was no probable cause to believe that a crime had been com-
mitted." 59 The authors then asserted that "[t]he above analysis
clearly indicates that arrest is not an option in the vast majority
(82.2%) of the spouse-like cases [to which the police respond]" be-
cause of the absence of probable cause. 60 This assumes that police
58 Often domestic violence continues after a couple separates, whether the couple
has been married or not. See Mahoney, supra note 42. Domestic violence also occurs in
dating relationships in which the couple is not cohabiting.




determinations of probable cause are objective and accurate. Be-
cause in most cases the police took no action or merely calmed
things down, the author concluded that these were situations that
involved "minor problems requiring little or no police action."
'6 1
What is wrong with this picture? For almost twenty years schol-
ars, advocates, and victims of abuse have been documenting that the
police tend to perceive, when looking at domestic violence situa-
tions, that no crime has been committed unless the victim has been
injured so badly that hospitalization is required. The police often
classify felony cases as misdemeanors or as non-criminal if the sus-
pect and the victim are intimate.62 Dispatchers assign these cases
low priority, so the response is often very slow, which reduces the
likelihood that the abuser will be on the scene when the police ar-
rive. Most important, police often find no probable cause because
the police do not believe the victims' allegations, sometimes because
the abuser denies them and sometimes for other reasons.
63
To examine whether there really was no objective basis to find
probable cause to arrest in such a high percentage of cases, the re-
searchers would need to interview the victims who called the police
and compare the police conclusions about the situation with the vic-
tims' stories. It seems unlikely, however, that 19,000 people in
Charlotte called the police (almost 9,000 "spouse-like") without a
good reason.
In drawing conclusions about their data in an earlier draft of
their article, Richard Berk and his co-authors offered the suggestion
that if some offenders pose higher risks of recidivating, one could
"further constraints on high risk offenders .... For example, bail
could be made much higher . . . .suspects could be strongly en-
couraged to make use of local shelters for battered women which
61 Id
62 A graphic example offered by Nancy Loving, infra note 63, from a newspaper
article:
It was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when a call came into the 103rd Precinct
station house in Jamaica, Queens, from a woman who said her husband had beaten
her, that her face was bleeding and bruised. She thought some of her ribs had been
broken.
"Can you help me?" she pleaded to the police officer who answered the phone. "My
husband's gone now, but he said he would come back and kill me. She was also
frightened, she said, that he would start beating the children when she returned.
"It's not a Police Department thing," the officer told her. "It's really a family thing.
You'll have to go to Family Court tomorrow. There's nothing that I can do."
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1976).
63 See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB:
BATrERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-22 (1982); See generally




might also reduce risk of retaliation. '64
Okay, it is a typo. And probably after the editors read this com-
ment, it will be corrected so that the victims are no longer referred
to as the suspects. But one assumes that this article was carefully
written, and probably proofread by more than one person before
the draft was turned in. And of course anyone could make a mis-
take. But one must wonder-why this mistake? Why do these au-
thors mix up the victims and the abusers? Would an advocate for
battered women have made this error?
5. The Goals of the Researchers
What do the researchers tell us about their motivations for un-
dertaking this work? Sherman, et al. say little about the purpose of
their study. What they do say is that, among the police with whom
they were working, "the primary concern was the reduction of calls
to police about domestic violence citywide." 65 This made it impor-
tant for them to look seriously at whether a disproportionate
number of calls were coming from a small number of offenders.
Perhaps it is so obvious as not to require mention, but I would
have thought the purpose of this study was to determine how to
prevent men from abusing women. If the police simply want to re-
duce the number of domestic calls that they have to respond to, I
can think of two simpler methods. (1) Disconnect the phone. (2) Go
back to the good old days, and just stop answering these calls.
IV. CONCLUSION
What are the implications for state legislators and policy makers
of this new research on the effectiveness of arrest as a deterrent in
domestic violence cases? Dr. Sherman takes the position that in
some cases, arresting the offender makes subsequent violence more
likely, and therefore, the laws mandating arrest of men who abuse
women should be repealed. Sherman acknowledges that prosecu-
tion and incarceration of offenders would incapacitate them and
might be a deterrent to others. But, he urges, resources are inade-
quate to undertake prosecution of these cases, because they are so
numerous, and even if the resources are available, many prosecutors
are not interested.
66
Dr. Sherman explains this recommendation by asserting that
64 Draft corresponding to Berk et al., supra note 31, at 198-99 (emphasis added).
65 See Sherman, et al., supra note 26, at 155.




based on the data indicating an escalation effect of arrest among
domestic abusers who are unemployed, unmarried, and black, it
would be irresponsible to continue to mandate arrests. While this
position undoubtedly reflects genuine concern that the police
should not take action which might cause harm, this reasoning also
provides a justification for withdrawing the criminal justice system
from efforts to stop domestic violence. The repeal of the mandatory
arrest laws would effect a dramatic cessation of treatment of domes-
tic abuse as a crime, since, in the absence of a mandate, the police
tend to exercise discretion not to arrest men who abuse women.
The replication data make a stronger case for more law enforce-
ment than they do for less law enforcement. The data show a high
likelihood of repeat assaults-this population of victims is in greater
danger than are victims of other violent crime. The data suggest
that the risks of subsequent violence is greater if the abuser has a
criminal record (Charlotte) or if the abuser is unemployed, unmar-
ried, or black and is arrested (Milwaukee). This offers a possible
basis for targeting certain categories of cases for careful and diligent
prosecution and for strenuous efforts to jail offenders and to pro-
vide services to the victims. No one has yet tested whether a full-
scale effort to enforce the law in these cases will produce deterrence,
but neither has such an effect been demonstrated for cases involving
homicide or drug-dealing. The entire system would grind to a halt
if policy initiatives were contingent upon empirical proof of their
effectiveness.
In states which have or are considering enactment of mandatory
arrest laws, legislators should examine other steps that would help
to ensure full enforcement of the law. Legislative options include:
funds for domestic violence programs, including shelters, counsel-
ing programs; funds to set up domestic violence units in prosecu-
tors' offices; funds to provide training for prosecutors, judges, court
personnel and others, on handling of domestic violence cases. State
legislatures could enact legislation that would require prosecutors
to keep data on their handling of domestic abuse cases and require
them to make a written record of reasons for decisions not to prose-
cute. They could enact legislation that would increase the post-
arrest protection offered to victims of abuse during and after prose-
cution of a charge, by providing for criminal courts to issue specific
protective orders as a condition of release and as a condition of pro-
bation, and by increasing supervision of abusers while charges are
pending and during probation.
In some states it is not possible at present to propose new ap-
propriations. If new resources are not available, the question be-
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comes one of priorities. Prosecutors need to re-evaluate the low
priority often assigned to domestic assault. If a principal goal of
prosecuting criminals is to protect members of a community from
harm, then crimes of violence against persons should be given pri-
ority over crimes against property. Violent crimes in which the vic-
tim is in continuing danger should be accorded even higher priority
than isolated assaults against strangers. A prosecutor might con-
sider reallocating resources presently devoted to prosecution of
shoplifters, prostitutes, and burglars to prosecuting men who re-
peatedly assault women with whom they are or have been in inti-
mate relationships.
The data from the replication studies should lead us to worry
about communities in which the police are required to make arrests,
and in which the state takes no post-arrest action to protect the vic-
tims from further assaults. The escalation effect of arrest on some
offenders makes clear that "arrest-only" is not an adequate law en-
forcement response to domestic violence. But the lesson for legisla-
tors, researchers, advocates, prosecutors, judges, and police is that
we must focus not only on police conduct in domestic abuse cases,
but also on whether and how prosecutors and judges are enforcing
the law.
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